497 lines
19 KiB
Python
497 lines
19 KiB
Python
# Copyright (c) 2025 Patrick Motsch
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# All rights reserved.
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"""
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Authentication module for backend API.
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Handles JWT-based authentication, token generation, and user context.
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Multi-Tenant Design:
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- Token ist NICHT an einen Mandanten gebunden
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- User arbeitet parallel in mehreren Mandanten (z.B. mehrere Browser-Tabs)
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- Mandant-Kontext wird per Request-Header (X-Mandate-Id) bestimmt
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- Request-Context kapselt User + Mandant + Feature-Instanz + geladene Rollen
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"""
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from typing import Optional, Dict, Any, Tuple, List
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from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, status, Request, Response, Header
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from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer, HTTPAuthorizationCredentials
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from jose import JWTError, jwt
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import logging
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from slowapi import Limiter
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from slowapi.util import get_remote_address
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from modules.shared.configuration import APP_CONFIG
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from modules.security.rootAccess import getRootDbAppConnector, getRootUser
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from modules.interfaces.interfaceDbApp import getInterface, getRootInterface
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from modules.datamodels.datamodelUam import User, AuthAuthority, AccessLevel
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from modules.datamodels.datamodelSecurity import Token, TokenPurpose
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from modules.datamodels.datamodelRbac import AccessRule
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# Get Config Data
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SECRET_KEY = APP_CONFIG.get("APP_JWT_KEY_SECRET")
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ALGORITHM = APP_CONFIG.get("Auth_ALGORITHM")
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ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES = int(APP_CONFIG.get("APP_TOKEN_EXPIRY"))
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REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS = int(APP_CONFIG.get("APP_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY", "7"))
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# Cookie-based Authentication Setup
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class CookieAuth(HTTPBearer):
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"""Cookie-based authentication that checks httpOnly cookies first, then Authorization header"""
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def __init__(self, auto_error: bool = True):
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super().__init__(auto_error=auto_error)
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async def __call__(self, request: Request) -> Optional[str]:
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# 1. Check httpOnly cookie first (preferred method)
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token = request.cookies.get('auth_token')
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if token:
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return token
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# 2. Fallback to Authorization header for API calls
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authorization = request.headers.get("Authorization")
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if authorization and authorization.startswith("Bearer "):
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return authorization.split(" ")[1]
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if self.auto_error:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Not authenticated")
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return None
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# Initialize cookie-based auth
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cookieAuth = CookieAuth(auto_error=False)
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# Rate Limiter
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limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_remote_address)
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# Logger
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Note: JWT creation and cookie helpers moved to modules.auth.jwtService
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def _getUserBase(token: str = Depends(cookieAuth)) -> User:
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"""
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Extracts and validates the current user from the JWT token.
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Args:
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token: JWT Token from the Authorization header
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Returns:
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User model instance
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Raises:
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HTTPException: For invalid token or user
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"""
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credentialsException = HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Invalid authentication credentials",
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headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
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)
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# Guard: token may be None or malformed when cookie/header is missing or bad
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if not token or not isinstance(token, str):
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logger.warning("Missing JWT Token (no cookie/header)")
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raise credentialsException
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# Basic JWT format check (header.payload.signature)
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try:
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if token.count(".") != 2:
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logger.warning("Malformed JWT token format")
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raise credentialsException
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except Exception:
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# If anything odd happens while checking format, treat as invalid creds
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raise credentialsException
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try:
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# Decode token
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payload = jwt.decode(token, SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[ALGORITHM])
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# Extract username from token
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username: str = payload.get("sub")
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if username is None:
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raise credentialsException
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# Extract user ID from token
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# MULTI-TENANT: mandateId is NO LONGER in the token - it comes from X-Mandate-Id header
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userId: str = payload.get("userId")
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authority: str = payload.get("authenticationAuthority")
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tokenId: Optional[str] = payload.get("jti")
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sessionId: Optional[str] = payload.get("sid") or payload.get("sessionId")
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# Only userId is required in token now (no mandateId)
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if not userId:
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logger.error(f"Missing userId in token")
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raise credentialsException
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except JWTError:
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logger.warning("Invalid JWT Token")
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raise credentialsException
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# Get root user and interface for database access
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rootUser = getRootUser()
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appInterface = getInterface(rootUser)
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# Retrieve user from database
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user = appInterface.getUserByUsername(username)
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if user is None:
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logger.warning(f"User {username} not found")
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raise credentialsException
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# Check if user is enabled
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if not user.enabled:
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logger.warning(f"User {username} is disabled")
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="User is disabled")
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# Ensure the user ID in token matches the user in database
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# MULTI-TENANT: mandateId is NO LONGER checked here - it comes from headers
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if str(user.id) != str(userId):
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logger.error(f"User ID mismatch: token(userId={userId}) vs user(id={user.id})")
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="User context has changed. Please log in again.",
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headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
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)
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# For LOCAL gateway JWTs, enforce DB-backed token validity and revocation
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try:
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# Normalize authority to string for comparison
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normalized_authority = (str(authority).lower() if authority is not None else None)
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# If we have a token id, check if a corresponding DB token exists for local authority
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db_tokens = []
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if tokenId:
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try:
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dbApp = getRootDbAppConnector()
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db_tokens = dbApp.getRecordset(
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Token, recordFilter={"id": tokenId}
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)
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except Exception as e:
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# Check if this is a table not found error (token table was deleted)
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if "does not exist" in str(e).lower() or "relation" in str(e).lower():
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logger.error("Token table does not exist - database may have been reset")
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_503_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
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detail="Authentication service temporarily unavailable. Please contact administrator."
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)
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db_tokens = []
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if db_tokens:
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# There is a server record for this token; enforce status and context when local
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db_token = db_tokens[0]
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token_authority = str(db_token.get("authority", "")).lower()
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if token_authority == str(AuthAuthority.LOCAL.value):
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# Must be active and match user/session
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# MULTI-TENANT: mandateId is NOT checked here - tokens are no longer mandate-bound
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active_token = appInterface.findActiveTokenById(
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tokenId=tokenId,
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userId=user.id,
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authority=AuthAuthority.LOCAL,
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sessionId=sessionId,
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mandateId=None, # Token is no longer mandate-bound
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)
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if not active_token:
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logger.info(
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f"Local JWT db record not active/valid: jti={tokenId}, userId={user.id}, sessionId={sessionId}"
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)
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raise credentialsException
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elif token_authority == str(AuthAuthority.GOOGLE.value):
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active_token = appInterface.findActiveTokenById(
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tokenId=tokenId,
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userId=user.id,
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authority=AuthAuthority.GOOGLE,
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sessionId=sessionId,
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mandateId=None,
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tokenPurpose=TokenPurpose.AUTH_SESSION.value,
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)
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if not active_token:
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logger.info(
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f"Google JWT db record not active/valid: jti={tokenId}, userId={user.id}"
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)
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raise credentialsException
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elif token_authority == str(AuthAuthority.MSFT.value):
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active_token = appInterface.findActiveTokenById(
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tokenId=tokenId,
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userId=user.id,
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authority=AuthAuthority.MSFT,
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sessionId=sessionId,
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mandateId=None,
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tokenPurpose=TokenPurpose.AUTH_SESSION.value,
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)
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if not active_token:
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logger.info(
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f"Microsoft JWT db record not active/valid: jti={tokenId}, userId={user.id}"
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)
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raise credentialsException
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else:
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# No DB record for this token. If the claim says local (or missing/unknown), require DB record.
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if normalized_authority in (
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None,
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"",
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str(AuthAuthority.LOCAL.value),
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str(AuthAuthority.GOOGLE.value),
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str(AuthAuthority.MSFT.value),
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):
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logger.info(
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"JWT without server record or missing authority claim (local/google/msft require DB row)"
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)
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raise credentialsException
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except HTTPException:
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raise
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"Error during local token validation: {str(e)}")
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raise credentialsException
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return user
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def getCurrentUser(currentUser: User = Depends(_getUserBase)) -> User:
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"""Get current active user with additional validation."""
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# Check if current user is enabled
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if not currentUser.enabled:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail="User is disabled"
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)
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return currentUser
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# =============================================================================
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# MULTI-TENANT: Request Context System
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# =============================================================================
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class RequestContext:
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"""
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Request context for multi-tenant operations.
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Contains user, mandate context, feature instance context, and loaded role IDs.
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This context is per-request (not persisted) - follows stateless design.
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IMPORTANT: SysAdmin also needs explicit membership for mandate context!
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isSysAdmin flag does NOT give implicit access to mandate data.
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"""
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def __init__(self, user: User):
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self.user: User = user
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self.mandateId: Optional[str] = None
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self.featureInstanceId: Optional[str] = None
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self.roleIds: List[str] = []
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# Request-scoped cache: rules loaded only once per request
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self._cachedRules: Optional[List[tuple]] = None
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def getRules(self) -> List[tuple]:
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"""
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Loads rules once per request (not across requests).
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Returns list of (priority, AccessRule) tuples.
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"""
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if self._cachedRules is None:
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if not self.mandateId:
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# No mandate context = no rules
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self._cachedRules = []
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else:
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try:
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rootUser = getRootUser()
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appInterface = getInterface(rootUser)
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self._cachedRules = appInterface.rbac.getRulesForUserBulk(
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self.user.id,
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self.mandateId,
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self.featureInstanceId
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)
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"Error loading RBAC rules: {e}")
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self._cachedRules = []
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return self._cachedRules
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@property
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def isSysAdmin(self) -> bool:
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"""Convenience property: Infrastructure/System Operator flag.
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For Category A (Logs, Tokens, DB-Health, i18n-Master, Registry).
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Wirkt auch als RBAC-Engine-Bypass (siehe rbac.py:getUserPermissions)."""
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return getattr(self.user, 'isSysAdmin', False)
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@property
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def isPlatformAdmin(self) -> bool:
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"""Convenience property: Cross-Mandate-Governance flag.
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For Categories B–E (User-/Mandate-/RBAC-/Feature-Registry über alle Mandanten).
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KEIN RBAC-Bypass — Daten-Zugriff geht weiterhin über Mandanten-Mitgliedschaft."""
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return getattr(self.user, 'isPlatformAdmin', False)
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def getRequestContext(
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request: Request,
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mandateId: Optional[str] = Header(None, alias="X-Mandate-Id"),
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featureInstanceId: Optional[str] = Header(None, alias="X-Instance-Id"),
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currentUser: User = Depends(getCurrentUser)
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) -> RequestContext:
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"""
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Determines request context from headers.
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Checks authorization and loads role IDs.
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Security Model:
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- Regular users: Must be explicit members of mandates/feature instances.
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- isSysAdmin users: RBAC-Engine-Bypass; können jeden Mandant für
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Infrastruktur-Operationen betreten ohne Mitgliedschaft. ``ctx.roleIds``
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bleibt leer (Bypass läuft direkt in ``rbac.py:getUserPermissions``).
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- isPlatformAdmin users: Cross-Mandate-Governance; können jeden Mandant
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betreten, aber Routen prüfen die Berechtigung explizit via
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``requirePlatformAdmin``. ``ctx.roleIds`` bleibt leer.
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Args:
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request: FastAPI Request object
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mandateId: Mandate ID from X-Mandate-Id header
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featureInstanceId: Feature instance ID from X-Instance-Id header
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currentUser: Current authenticated user
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Returns:
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RequestContext with user, mandate, roles
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Raises:
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HTTPException 403: If user is not member of mandate (and not Sys/Platform admin)
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"""
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ctx = RequestContext(user=currentUser)
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isSysAdmin = getattr(currentUser, 'isSysAdmin', False)
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isPlatformAdmin = getattr(currentUser, 'isPlatformAdmin', False)
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# Get root interface for membership checks
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rootInterface = getRootInterface()
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if mandateId:
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# Check mandate membership
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membership = rootInterface.getUserMandate(currentUser.id, mandateId)
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if membership:
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# User is a member - load their roles
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if not membership.enabled:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail="Mandate membership is disabled"
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)
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ctx.mandateId = mandateId
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ctx.roleIds = rootInterface.getRoleIdsForUserMandate(membership.id)
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elif isSysAdmin or isPlatformAdmin:
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# Platform-level authority can enter any mandate without membership.
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# No fake role loading: isSysAdmin bypasses RBAC engine; platform-admin
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# routes verify authority explicitly via requirePlatformAdmin.
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ctx.mandateId = mandateId
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ctx.roleIds = []
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logger.debug(
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f"Platform-level user {currentUser.id} accessing mandate {mandateId} "
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f"(isSysAdmin={isSysAdmin}, isPlatformAdmin={isPlatformAdmin})"
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)
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else:
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# Regular user without membership - denied
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logger.warning(f"User {currentUser.id} is not member of mandate {mandateId}")
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail="Not member of mandate"
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)
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if featureInstanceId:
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# Check feature access
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access = rootInterface.getFeatureAccess(currentUser.id, featureInstanceId)
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if access:
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# User has access - load their instance roles
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if not access.enabled:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail="Feature access is disabled"
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)
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ctx.featureInstanceId = featureInstanceId
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instanceRoleIds = rootInterface.getRoleIdsForFeatureAccess(access.id)
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ctx.roleIds.extend(instanceRoleIds)
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elif isSysAdmin or isPlatformAdmin:
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# Platform-level authority can enter any feature instance without
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# explicit access record.
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ctx.featureInstanceId = featureInstanceId
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logger.debug(
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f"Platform-level user {currentUser.id} accessing feature instance "
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f"{featureInstanceId} (isSysAdmin={isSysAdmin}, "
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f"isPlatformAdmin={isPlatformAdmin})"
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)
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else:
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# Regular user without access - denied
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logger.warning(f"User {currentUser.id} has no access to feature instance {featureInstanceId}")
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail="No access to feature instance"
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)
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return ctx
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def requireSysAdmin(currentUser: User = Depends(getCurrentUser)) -> User:
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"""
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SysAdmin check for system-level operations.
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Use this dependency for endpoints that require SysAdmin privileges.
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SysAdmin has access to system-level operations, but NOT to mandate data.
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Args:
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currentUser: Current authenticated user
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Returns:
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User if they are a SysAdmin
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Raises:
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HTTPException 403: If user is not a SysAdmin
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"""
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if not getattr(currentUser, 'isSysAdmin', False):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail="SysAdmin privileges required"
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)
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# Audit for all SysAdmin actions
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try:
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from modules.shared.auditLogger import audit_logger
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audit_logger.logSecurityEvent(
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userId=str(currentUser.id),
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mandateId="system",
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action="sysadmin_action",
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details="System-level operation"
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)
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except Exception:
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# Don't fail if audit logging fails
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pass
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return currentUser
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# =============================================================================
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# PLATFORM ADMIN: Flag-based cross-mandate governance (replaces sysadmin role)
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# =============================================================================
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def requirePlatformAdmin(currentUser: User = Depends(getCurrentUser)) -> User:
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"""
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Require Platform-Admin flag for cross-mandate governance operations.
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Verwendung für alle Operationen, die mandanten-übergreifend wirken:
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User-Mgmt, Mandate-Mgmt, RBAC-Catalog, Feature-Registry, User-Access-Overview,
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Cross-Mandate-Audit, Cross-Mandate-Billing-Übersicht, Subscription-Mgmt.
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KEIN RBAC-Bypass: Daten-Zugriff auf einen einzelnen Mandanten erfordert
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weiterhin Mitgliedschaft (oder zusätzlich isSysAdmin für Infrastruktur-Bypass).
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Args:
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currentUser: Current authenticated user
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Returns:
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User if they have isPlatformAdmin=True
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Raises:
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HTTPException 403: If user is not a Platform Admin
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"""
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if not getattr(currentUser, 'isPlatformAdmin', False):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail="Platform admin privileges required"
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)
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# Audit for all Platform-Admin actions
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try:
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from modules.shared.auditLogger import audit_logger
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audit_logger.logSecurityEvent(
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userId=str(currentUser.id),
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mandateId="system",
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action="platform_admin_action",
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details="Cross-mandate governance operation"
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)
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except Exception:
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pass
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return currentUser
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